Alfred Schutz’s main contributions to the field of economic reflection by López, Daniela Griselda
SOCIETÀMUTAMENTOPOLITICA, ISSN 2038-3150, vol. 6, n. 12, pp. 203-229, 2015
www.fupress.com/smp – © Firenze University Press DOI: 10.13128/SMP-17855
Alfred Schutz’s main contributions  
to the field of economic reflection
Daniela Griselda López
For several decades, contemporary social theory has held a considerable misunderstanding around phe-
nomenologically oriented sociolog y, which has undermined its heuristic potential and, as a consequence, 
has pushed its conclusions to a marginal place in current discussions. In contrast, our article aims to 
recover that hermeneutical framework in order to think economic phenomena such as the economic action 
and the order of the market processes. It is undeniable that Alfred Schutz’s work provides theoretical and 
methodological elements for the sociological analysis of the economic world. The linkages between Schutz- 
ian sociolog y and economic reflection vary widely, ranging from his formative stage within the context 
of the Mises Circle to the current recovery of his work by Economic Sociolog y. Within this framework, 
the aim of this work is to summarize Schutz’s main contributions to the field of economic reflection. 
The recovery and systematization of the Schutzian vocabulary -in the interface between sociolog y and 
economics- can contribute with new elements not only to think from a theoretical point of view but also 
to address economic phenomena empirically. 
Introduction
For many decades, contemporary sociological theory has held a consider-
able misunderstanding around phenomenologically oriented sociology, which 
has undermined its heuristic potential and, as a consequence, has pushed its 
conclusions to a marginal place in current discussions. Thus, Alfred Schutz’s 
sociology has frequently been interpreted as a paradigmatic example of «sub-
jectivism» given that it supposedly places exclusive emphasis on the actors’ 
«subjective» interpretations, occluding –not to say denying– the possibility of 
thinking «objective» social structures such as power relations or social order. 
However, the indication that there exists a misunderstanding around labe-
ling Schutz as subjectivist is not new. Some years ago, an expert on his work 
(Endress 2005) defended phenomenology against the accusation of subjectiv-
ism when he critically examined the way in which Pierre Bourdieu shapes 
his slogan-like label «subjectivism». Along these lines, in previous research, 
we demonstrated the groundless character of the dominant criticism against 
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Schutz’s work shedding a new light on his reflection around themes such as 
social order (López 2012, 2014a, 2014b) and power (Dreher & López 2015). 
In the framework of that research, the recovery of the connections between 
the author and the Austrian School of Economics became a central theme, 
because it is in that intellectual context that his sociology develops and where 
his notion of the life-world is based, a notion which makes clear the author’s 
interest not only in the subjective aspects but also in the objective dimension 
of social reality (López 2014c). The ideas we present herein stems from those 
previous investigations and from an interest in recovering Schutz’s contribu-
tions both to the theoretical and to the empirical sociological research on 
economic phenomena. The reflection will be conducted in the interface of 
phenomenologically oriented sociology and economics, specifically highlight-
ing the theoretical potential of the Schutzian paradigm for the study of the 
economic world.
In order to accomplish this goal, the first section presents a detailed 
overview of the links between Schutzian sociology and economic reflection. 
Our attention is primarily focused: a) on the Austrian roots of Schutzian epis-
temological concern which – as we will show later in this work – was directed 
not only at social sciences in general but also at economics in particular; b) on 
the Schutzian roots in the contemporary discussions of Austrian Economics, 
i.e., in the debate opened some decades ago about the links between herme-
neutics and economics; and, c) on the appropriation of Schutz’s work by Euro-
pean economic sociology, i.e., the studies which make fruitful use of Schutzian 
phenomenological program for the empirical research of market processes. In 
the second section we propose that it is the problem of economic coordination 
that at first glance seems to have profited most from the Schutzian perspec-
tive and we present a review of the main contributions of Schutzian sociology 
to that paradigmatic problem of economics. Finally, in the third section and 
closely related to the previous one a critical analysis of Schutzian alleged po-
litical liberalism is sketched out.
Schutzian sociology and economic reflection
The Austrian roots of Schutzian reflection
The analysis of the links of Schutz’s sociology with the economic reflec-
tion constitutes a rich and prolific field of study not only for the specialists 
in his work, but also for interpretive economics and for economic sociology 
itself. The first of the multiple cross-links which can be highlighted organ-
izes around the Austrian School of Economics. As mentioned before, what 
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motivated our previous work was the inquiry on the «Austrian roots of Schut-
zian reflection», which go through his project of a sociology of the life-world 
(López 2014c). There is ample evidence1 to assert that the discussions within 
the Mises Circle constitute the immediate antecedent of Schutzian sociology: 
«economic issues (…) are important to Schutz’s early intellectual development 
and provide much of the context of Schutz’s great work, The Phenomenology 
of the Social World» (Koppl & Augier 2011: 15). Motivated by the purpose of 
finding a response to the problem posed by Misean apriorism Schutz largely 
concentrates on the phenomenological foundations of the concepts of social 
sciences. Misean theory of catallactics was part of a pure a priori theory of 
action considered as abstracted from its historical circumstances: «though the 
men of the Middle Ages would not have understood the law of marginal util-
ity, they nevertheless did not and could not act otherwise than as the law of 
marginal utility describes. Even the man of the Middle Ages sought to appor-
tion the means at his disposal in such a way that he attained the same level 
of satisfaction in every single kind of want» (Mises 1933 [2003]: 103). The 
implications of such a theory included a disconnection of economic concepts 
from worldly life and a rigid dichotomy between theoretical and historical 
sciences. While the object of inquiry of catallactics was subjective actions, the 
methodology of formation of objective categories consisted in an intellectual 
intuition which involved «oblivion» or a disconnection of the subject under-
stood as a real person. The problem of formalism that the Austrian tradition 
represented by Mises’ work entailed, involved a separation of theory from the 
contact with the life-world. Against this background, Schutz’s epistemological 
concern was directed not only at social sciences in general but also at econom-
ics in particular. As Lester Embree clearly explains, Schutz’s reflection on 
economics as a theoretical social science «is expounded in relation to his the-
ory of science especially what he calls ‘postulates’» (Embree 2009: 165). These 
postulates of wide application -called «procedural rules» or «rules for scientific 
procedure»- are the postulates of subjective meaning and of adequacy. As viewed 
by Schutz, and in stark contrast to the Austrian tradition of Carl Menger and 
Mises, the concept of action must refer to the subjects within the social world 
and to the interpretation of the actors in terms of systems of projects, available 
means, motives, relevances, plans, and so on. With regard to this postulate of 
subjective meaning it is worth remembering the repeatedly cited quotation by 
Schutz that applies to our discussion:
1  See also Prendergast (1986), Foss (1996), Koppl (1997), Boettke (1998), Kurrild-Klitgaard 
(2001, 2003), Knudsen (2004), Barber (2004), Wilson (2005), Srubar (2007).
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Is it not the “behavior of  prices” rather than the behavior of  men in the mar-
ket situation which is studied by the economist, the “shape of  demand curves” 
rather than the anticipations of  economic subjects symbolized by such curves? 
Does not the economist investigate successfully subject matters such as “sav-
ings,” “capital,” “business cycle,” “wages” and “unemployment,” “multipli-
ers” and “monopoly” as if  these phenomena were entirely detached from any 
activity of  the economic subjects, even less without entering into the subjective 
meaning structure such activities may have for them? (…) Closer investigation, 
however; reveals that this abstract conceptual scheme is nothing else than a 
kind of  intellectual shorthand and that the underlying subjective elements of  
human actions involved are either taken for granted or deemed to be irrelevant 
with respect to the scientific purpose at hand - the problem under scrutiny - 
and are, therefore, disregarded. Correctly understood, the postulate of  subjec-
tive interpretation as applied to economics as well as to all the other social sci-
ences means merely that we always can - and for certain purposes must - refer to 
the activities of  the subjects within the social world and their interpretation by 
the actors in terms of  systems of  projects, available means, motives, relevances, 
and so on (Schutz 1962: 34-35).
On the other hand, the postulate of adequacy «deals with the formation of 
ideal-typical constructs» and «states that the type must be sufficient to explain the 
action without contradicting previous experience» (Schutz 1932 [1967]: 236. Italics in 
original). As stated by Schutz, each term in a scientific model of human action 
must be constructed in such a way that a human act performed within the life-
world by an individual actor in the way indicated by the typical construct would 
be understandable for the actor him or herself as well as for his or her fellows in 
terms of common-sense interpretation of everyday life. Compliance with this 
postulate warrants the consistency of the constructs of the social scientist with the 
constructs of common-sense experience of the social reality (Schutz 1962: 44).
Both postulates «serve to anchor the second-order constructs of the cultur-
al scientists in the first-order constructs through which the actors themselves 
understand the social world» (Embree 2009: 171). The cultural sciences «de-
velop a model of the social world in terms of a system of mutually coordinated 
ideal types of actions as well as relationships, situations, and products». The 
ideal types «also called “constructs” (…) are actually concepts of a higher 
level, i.e., constructs about constructs» (Embree 2009: 169). 
All in all, as a social scientist both economist and sociologist try to explain 
the economic phenomena using the postulate of subjective interpretation and 
the postulate of adequacy. Both should refer to the actor within the social world. 
The notion of life-world becomes the touchstone of Schutzian theory of social 
sciences. The life-world is conceived as a subjective formation resulting from 
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the activities of the subjective pre-scientific experience: «Schutz’s big achieve-
ment in the present context is the “descriptive analysis of economics” (…), which 
elucidates what economists do. Most of them, including Mises, overlooked the 
lifeworldly ground of economic theory» (Eberle 2009: 505. Italics in original). 
Closely related, Schutz is very critical of the principle of marginal util-
ity «the fundamental hypothesis of modern theoretical economics» (Embree 
2009: 175). He offers a critique to that principle which, he believed, functions 
as a regulator of the creation of concepts in economics. Schutz agrees with 
Mises that social theory should seek a prioris. But, in agreement with Hus-
serl, he proposes a different notion. The a priori cannot be stated as proposi-
tions, such as laws and principles, but rather should be sought after at a more 
fundamental level, mainly in the constitutive features of the life-world. As I 
have shown elsewhere (López 2014c), the concepts of the social sciences are 
grounded in the structure of the life-world. The postulate of subjective mean-
ing leads quite quickly to the sphere of intersubjectivity. As a consequence, the 
structure of the life-world not only has its roots in the experience of the soli-
tary ego but also in the sphere of intersubjectivity: in the realm of the directly 
experienced social reality, the face-to-face relationship; and in the realm of 
the indirectly experienced social reality, the realm of contemporaries, prede-
cessors and successors. In both areas Schutz develops two a priori structures 
of consciousness related to intersubjectivity: the pure We-relationship and the 
pure They-relationship. The pure We-relationship constitutes an a priori struc-
ture of consciousness linked to the realm of the directly experienced social 
reality and is characteristic of the domain of face-to-face relationships. Schutz 
calls «pure We-relationship» the face-to-face relationship in which the part-
ners are aware of each other and sympathetically participate in each other’s 
lives for however short a time. But likewise, the «pure We-relationship» is only 
a limiting concept. The directly experienced social relationship of real life 
is the pure We-relationship concretized and actualized to a greater or lesser 
degree and filled with content. On the other hand, the pure They-relationship 
constitutes an a priori structure of consciousness linked to the realm of the 
indirectly experienced social reality. My face-to-face encounters with others 
have given me a deep prepredicative knowledge of the Thou as a self. But the 
Thou who is merely my contemporary is never experienced personally as a 
self and never prepredicatively. On the contrary, all experience of contempo-
raries is predicative in nature. It is formed by means of interpretive judgments 
involving all my knowledge of the social world, although with varying degrees 
of explicitness. The term «They-orientation» is defined by the peculiar way 
in which I apprehend the conscious experiences of my contemporaries. For I 
apprehend them as anonymous processes. The «They-orientation» is the pure 
form of understanding the contemporary in a predicative fashion, that is, in 
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terms of his or her typical characteristics or ideal types. These make up first 
order constructs, the foundation and reference point for any second order con-
struct in social sciences. That’s the reason why the concepts of social sciences 
are grounded in the constitutive features of the life-world. However, there are 
no propositions related to the contents of those formal features; these contents 
may vary in different social, cultural and historical contexts and should be 
empirically explored (López 2014c: 22).
Schutzian criticism toward Misean formalism and his reflections on the 
need to find the foundation of the concepts of social sciences in the constitu-
tive features of the life-world brings to mind Karl Polanyi’s criticism of eco-
nomic theory for being essentially «formal» (Polanyi 1957 [1992]), i.e., a kind 
of logic focused on choice, the means-end relationship, and the alleged scar-
city of things that people want. To the formal concept of economics Polanyi 
counterposes a «substantive» concept, grounded in reality and not in logic 
(Swedberg & Smelser 2005: 13): «the substantive meaning of economic derives 
from man’s dependence for his living upon nature and his fellows» (Polanyi 
1957 [1992]: 29).
By distancing himself from those formal principles of catallactics Schutz 
distinguishes theoretical economics with economic history or economic 
sociology2:
The so-called ‘principles of  catallactics’ certainly have as their subject mat-
ter human acts considered as finished products, not actions in progress. The 
meaning-content of  these principles is exhausted in the subsumption of  such 
acts under the interpretive schemes of  economic theory. To be sure, no eco-
nomic act is conceivable without some reference to an economic actor, but the 
latter is absolutely anonymous; it is no you, nor I, nor an entrepreneur, nor 
even an “economic man” as such, but a pure universal “one.” (…) However, 
one can study the economic actor as such and try to find out what is going on 
in his mind; of  course, one is not then engaged in theoretical economics but in 
economic history or economic sociology (Schutz 1932 [1967]: 137).
According to Schutz, economic sociology is not engaged in theoretical 
economics; instead it aims at studying economic action with reference to an 
economic actor, not a universal «one», but a concrete actor living among other 
fellows in social, cultural and historical contexts.
2  In Collected Papers II (1964a), Schutz reworks this contrast between theoretical economics and 
economic sociology in the distinction between pure theory and applied theory (Embree 2009: 167).
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The Schutzian roots in the contemporary discussions of Austrian Economics
Within the framework of the analysis of the links of Schutz’s sociology with 
the economic reflection it is also possible to trace the «Schutzian roots in 
the contemporary discussions of Austrian Economics» in the debate opened 
some decades ago about the links between hermeneutics and economics. The 
discussions within Austrian tradition around the importance of sociologi-
cal analysis constitute a development independent from and parallel to con-
temporary economic sociology which has a common ground in the strong 
criticism against essential principles of neoclassical economics regarding the 
economic behavior of the individual3. During the late 80’s and early 90’s an 
«interpretive turn» was introduced in the economic sciences. These econo-
mists, interested in recovering the relevance of interpretive theory for Austri-
an Economics, formulated what was called «economics of meaning» (Boettke, 
Lavoie, & Storr 2001) or «interpretive economics» (Boettke 1990; Prychitko 
1990)4. This movement gave place to a paradigmatic book on the epistemo-
logical turn edited by Donald Lavoie, Economics and Hermeneutics (1991), which 
mainly deals with the link between those two intellectual traditions that until 
then had been total strangers. The two economists who provoked the debate 
on the use of hermeneutics to revise Austrian Economics were Richard Ebe-
ling (1985, 1986), who had drawn principally from the works of Schutz and 
Paul Ricoeur, and Lavoie (1986), who made use of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s 
ideas. Both authors found inspiration in the work of Ludwig Lachmann and 
his book The Legacy of Max Weber (1970), immediate precedent for the attempt 
at establishing bridges between sociology and Austrian economics. In fact it is 
maintained that Lachmann’s book on Weber can be called «the first explicitly 
hermeneutical contribution to Austrian Economics» (Lavoie 1991: 13). Schut-
zian sociology allowed overcoming the limitations of neoclassical thought. 
In opposition to the rational maximization of the individuals, these authors 
pick up Schutz’s claims regarding the existence of intersubjective structures of 
meaning which enable the individual to act in the social world. In his book, 
Lachmann sought to articulate how the troublesome aspects of the Weberian 
concept of ideal type could be replaced with the notion of plan. According to 
the author, human action exists as a scheme of plans designed to reach ima-
gined futures: 
3  For a comparison of  mainstream economics and contemporary economic sociology see 
Swedberg and Smelser  (2005: 3-6).
4  It is important to mention that Werner Sombart was the first sociologist who pointed out the 
need for a «verstehende economics» (Sombart 1930 [2003]).
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One trait distinguishes all cultural phenomena from natural ones. When men 
act they carry in their minds an image of  what they want to achieve. All hu-
man action can be regarded as the carrying out of  projects that are designed to 
give effect to imagined ends. But every man pursues a multiplicity of  ends, the 
achievement of  at least some of  which precludes that of  other ends. Moreover, 
the scarcity of  the means at the disposal of  each actor imposes further re-
straints upon his choice. In other words, men have to choose the purposes they 
wish to achieve, and they have to make such choice within the constraints of  a 
given ‘situation’. To act at all, men have to make plans, comprehensive surveys 
of  the means at their disposal and the ways in which they might be used, and 
let their actions be guided by them (Lachmann 1970: 30).
This background was the kickstart for further developments. In Austrian 
Economics: a hermeneutic approach (1991), Lachmann was critical of the success 
that after 1930 had obtained the method of classical mechanics among econo-
mists. Economists all over the world followed Pareto in embracing that method 
as the only truly «scientific» method. In the decades that followed «this became 
the dominant style of thought in all countries» (Lachmann 1991: 132). In this 
environment, rational action became the methodological tool par excellence. The 
mainstream advocated the powerful tool of positive analysis, the objective model 
of rational action. The interpretive turn in social thought demanded a funda-
mental rethinking of basic questions given that modern discourse concerning 
economics and sociology was stalled at this point «concentrating on the merits 
and demerits of the rational choice framework for social analysis» (Boettke 
1998: 57). Then the hermeneutical Austrians’ challenge was primarily aimed 
at mainstream neoclassical economics, which they charge with the vice of for-
malism: «formalism is the artificial severing of economic theory construction 
from application, in effect the separation of theory from contact with the life-
world, with everyday reality as we know it» (Lavoie 1994: 55). However, the 
challenge had implications for the mainstream of the Austrian tradition as 
well: 
the overall hermeneutical challenge to tradicional Austrian economics can 
be summarized by referring to (…) three ‘core methodological tenets’ of  the 
school, subjectivism, methodological individualism and market process (…) 
For the school to take its own interpretive turn it will need to overcome its 
tendency towards atomism, which mistakenly locates the domain of  meaning 
in isolated individual minds, and objectivism, which over-dichotomizes the-
ory from history, and scientific from everyday understanding (Lavoie 1994: 
55-57).
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Given that Schutz had already drawn attention to the problem of formal-
ism characteristic of his intellectual context, the recovery of his work by con-
temporary Austrian tradition was not a random decision. 
Economic sociology
The third cross-link can be found in the appropriation of Schutz’s work 
by economic sociology in the studies which make fruitful use of the phenom-
enological program for the empirical research on market processes. In the 
«Introduction» of the Handbook of Economic Sociology (2005), Swedberg and 
Smelser acknowledges that new economic sociology is primarily a U.S. phe-
nomenon. However, many European contributions to economic sociology are 
mentioned, among which Schutzian phenomenology occupies a special place: 
«Knorr Cetina in Germany and Aspers in Sweden have independently of one 
another embarked on the project of applying phenomenology to economic 
sociology» (Swedberg & Smelser 2005: 19). 
In an article published in 2002 Karin Knorr Cetina and Urs Bruegger 
(Knorr Cetina & Bruegger 2002), examines the patterns of integration which 
distinguish the global social system embedded in economic transactions. 
Called «global microstructures» these patterns, which are global in scope but 
microsocial in character, constitute the basic features of the interaction order. 
The authors draw on Schutz’s reflection on the temporal coordination as the 
basis for the level of intersubjectivity for their analysis of global markets, which 
posit «a form of market coordination that supplements relational or network 
forms of coordination» (Knorr Cetina & Bruegger 2002: 905). In an article 
of 2004, they clarify this point: «one important purpose of this chapter is to 
bring together elements of several microsociological literatures –interaction-
ism, ethnomethodology, phenomenology– with elements from new economic 
sociology, specifically, its interest in institutions (…) in embeddedness, and in 
symbolic and expressive dimension of economic objects and activities» (Knorr 
Cetina & Bruegger 2004: 159).
The authors highlight the relevance of Schutzian approach or «microso-
ciology» to issues of globalization and to the understanding of markets «when 
they are sketched out in geographical space» (Knorr Cetina & Bruegger 2002: 
907). In those fields participants bridge the geographical distances and ori-
ent toward one another using patterns of relatedness and coordination called 
microstructures that are global in scope but microsocial in character and 
that assemble and link global domains. The authors also draw on Schutz and 
Luckmann’s notion of appresentation to advocate that participants’ reciprocal 
observation of markets in screens, combined with temporal coordination 
mechanisms, may constitute a basis for both a form of intersubjectivity and the 
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integration of some global spheres. Making use of this core notion of Schutz’s 
theory of symbols they describe the transportation of local details from par-
ticular time zones and geographical regions where they are observed to the 
global arena on screen. The «screen world» is the global market into which 
local details are transposed (Knorr Cetina & Bruegger 2004). This clearly 
shows the central role of the Schutzian approach to intersubjective structures 
and the importance of his theory of symbols in the analysis of economic phe-
nomena. The strategy for organizing their argument consists on recovering 
Schutzian analysis of temporal coordination at the level of intersubjectivity in 
order to «supplement» relational or network forms of coordination. The goal 
here is to complement or «bring together» Schutzian «microsociology» with 
the interest of economic sociology in relational or network analysis.
The major difference between Knorr Cetina’s approach and Aspers’ (As-
pers 2009) is that the latter does not aim at making use of Schutzian phenom-
enology in order to «supplement» other perspectives. Instead, his main objec-
tive is to introduce empirical phenomenology as an approach in its own right: 
phenomenology has taken three routes that are relevant to social sciences. The 
first is the one taken by Schütz and his followers, which is essentially non-
empirical. The second is ethnomethodology, which is only remotely related to 
phenomenology, and the third and perhaps most well known is the integration 
of  phenomenology into the mainstream of  social science. (…) I present what 
can be seen as a fourth route, empirical phenomenology, which is a devel-
opment based on interpretations of  the phenomenological literature (Aspers 
2009: 4).
The author intends to make Schutzian approach «more empirical applica-
ble» highlighting that the basic premise of empirical phenomenology is that 
an explanation in the social sciences should be connected with the meaning 
structure of real people. From this perspective, both the postulate of subjec-
tive interpretation and the postulate of adequacy proposed by Schutz are re-
covered. The author’s assessment of the practical implications of empirical 
phenomenology leads him to conclude that a fruitful strategy for accessing 
the perspective of actors could be participant observation and interviews. In 
order to «ensure that the actors’ perspective comes through, and thus that no 
scientific explanation exists unless what is studied is related to the first-order 
constructs of those studied» (Aspers 2009: 10). As claimed by Knorr Cetina: 
«[w]hat the phenomenological approach means in regard to data collection 
and data treatment is first of all a focus on actor’s meaning» (Knorr Cetina 
2006: x).
In the same line, Aspers (2006), recovers the phenomenological perspec-
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tive for empirical qualitative investigation in the fashion markets. The author 
conducted an empirical study of fashion photography in Sweden, an inves-
tigation of an understudied market. He maintains that a variety of actors 
are relevant to understanding these markets (fashion photographers, agents, 
editors of fashion magazines and art directors). As stated by Aspers, the three 
main goals that have been addressed in the book are: «to understand, and 
thereby explain, the market fashion of photography in Sweden, to present 
and ethnography of this market, and to incorporate the phenomenological 
approach to the social sciences» (Aspers 2006: 155). The author examines the 
relation between the different positions in those markets from Schutz’s notion 
of reciprocal expectations. This recovery of Schutzian work opens the discus-
sion on its general relevance to economic sociology and allows analyzing how 
far it is possible to go with this approach. 
The problem of economic coordination
Fundamentally, it is the problem of economic coordination that at first glance 
seems to have profited most from the Schutzian perspective. According to 
Knorr Cetina and Bruegger (2002), the starting point for an understanding 
of global microstructured domains is the distinction between «embodied pres-
ence» and «response presence», a differentiation which has a family resem-
blance to Schutzian distinction between We-relationship and They relation-
ship. The first one corresponds to the face-to-face situations, while the second 
corresponds to situations in which participants are capable of responding to 
one another and common objects in real time without being physically pre-
sent in the same place. The question that lies at the core of the notion of a 
response-presence-based social form that extends across global distances is: 
«what are the possibilities of its inherent connectivity and integration as the 
key to overcoming the geographical separation of participants?» (Knorr Ce-
tina & Bruegger 2002: 911). The response to this problem of coordination is 
the notion of global we-relationship which is based on temporal coordination. 
The notion suggests that a level of microintegration, or intersubjectivity, is 
possible in global fields.
In global markets, adjustments must be made to compensate for the geo-
graphic distance between participants. Schutzian concept of intersubjectivity 
allows the authors to characterize the social binding in this kind of markets, 
bringing into focus the idea of temporal coordination which is central to the 
phenomenon of intersubjectivity. Rather than two individual facing each oth-
er, they are interested in the example of two subjects watching a third object, 
for instance a bird flying, for the conceptualization of sociality of global fields: 
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«to illustrate global orientation in financial markets, we address the three ele-
ments that are central to intersubjectivity: (1) participants’ orientation toward 
and observation of a common object, (2) the reciprocity of these orientations, 
and (3) interlocking time dimensions» (Knorr Cetina & Bruegger 2002: 923). 
As opposed to face-to-face situation, the authors coin the concept of face-
to-screen situation. The face-to-screen concept replaces the face-to-face one 
in response-presence-based situations, i.e., the orientation of participants to-
ward the global sphere that is present on screen. Secondly, the reciprocity of 
orientations takes place when the screen itself, like a mirror, reflects market 
participants’ activities to one another in real time: «the reciprocity of observa-
tion is an essential and invariable aspect of these temporally focused global 
interaction systems, in addition to being an underlying source of intersubjec-
tivity» (Knorr Cetina & Bruegger 2002: 925). Finally, temporal coordination 
within the authors scheme means that these markets are communities of time, 
a condition that is central to their historical particularity conceived as a so-
cial system that overcome the geographic separation between participants. 
The aspects of temporal coordination between participants are: synchronic-
ity, continuity and temporal immediacy. Moreover, «temporal coordination 
involves a temporal division of labor across time zones, such that the com-
munity of time extends around the clock». All this complex structuration and 
reciprocity allow the authors to maintain the argument of a level of global 
intersubjectivity that extends beyond the face-to-face situation. It is important 
to indicate here that, according to the aforementioned point of view as regard 
the use of Schutzian phenomenology in order to «supplement» other perspect-
ives, the authors point out the need to distinguish between different forms of 
market coordination reciprocally related: the network form of coordination 
and the reflexive, temporal form of coordination.
The problem of coordination has also occupied contemporary Austrian 
tradition. In a similar manner, they highlight the problems that involve the 
temporal and geographic distance between participants:
how men, mutually dependent upon each other in that system of  division of  
labor, can successfully coordinate their activities for assurance of  a balance 
between the multitudes of  demands and supplies for various goods and services 
in a complex and developed market order (…). Clearly, such coordination of  
a vast number of  interpersonal plans, in which the market actors are separa-
ted from each other in terms both time and space, requires some mechanism 
through which expectations can be formed (Ebeling 1999: 120-121). 
In this regards, contemporary Austrian economics have benefited from 
Schutzian insights. The centrality of Schutz’s theory of ideal types and of 
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the notion of stock of knowledge is recovered by authors such as Storr (2010), 
Knudsen (2004), Kurrild-Klitgaard (2001), Mote (2001), Ebeling (1999), Kop-
pl (1997), Foss (1996) and Pietrykowski (1996), who claim that one of Schutz’s 
biggest contributions to the methodology of the social sciences is the introduc-
tion of a scale of ideal types based on growing degrees of anonymity. In this 
sense, several authors consider that Schutz’s studies foster understanding of 
the properties of the order creation of the market processes (Ebeling 1999; 
Foss 1996). And this coordination demands a mechanism through which mu-
tual expectations are formed. The Schutzian system of ideal types can help 
build that theory of expectations. Thus, Koppl, Foss and Pietrykowski «have 
looked to the ideal-type method as a way to better understand and model 
two primary economic phenomena: economic expectations and social order/
market coordination» (Mote 2001: 223). Foss, for instance, claims that in their 
daily-life situations, actors are skilled at coordinating their actions, because 
there are things that are more «prominent» than others. In their everyday 
lives, actors draw on the stock of knowledge they have in common, which 
consists of shared typifications of the social world. They are able to coordinate 
their actions because they are equipped with that everyday life knowledge, 
which includes an ample repertoire of courses-of-action and personal ideal 
types and because that common-sense knowledge is presupposed and has an 
origin and social acceptance. Foss makes use of the concept of «prominence» 
of Thomas Schelling, which functions as a principle for organizing common 
sense knowledge and typifications. However, he (as well as Koppl) disregards 
these typifications as being organized in domains of relevances, as Schutz 
states. It is Pietrykowski who moved forward in the direction of recovering 
Schutz’s theory of relevances, a key theme which has not yet been paid the 
attention it deserves. The author makes use of the notions of «intrinsic» and 
«imposed» relevances. Intrinsic relevances are related to the freedom of the 
individual to choose what he/she is interested in, whereas imposed relevances 
have to do with the fact that situations are also imposed on us as significant 
although they are not related to our own interests. Pietrykowski contends that 
«negotiation» of these (in some cases) conflicting relevances is a matter of «the 
readiness with which individuals accept or resist the imposition of the other’s 
relevances systems» which «differs from situation to situation»5.
Together with the aforementioned importance of the theory of the ideal 
types to give an answer to the «paradigmatic problem» of the economic theory, 
the limitations of Schutz’s theory regarding the concept of «unintended conse-
5  As I have shown elsewhere, through his valuable observations Pietrykowski opened the ana- 
lysis to the Schutzian problem of  relevance in the field of  economic reflection (López 2014c).
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quences» are also highlighted. The focus on the «unintended consequences» is 
based on the concept of the spontaneous social orders proposed by Friederich 
von Hayek, who emphasizes, among other things, that those orders are not 
the result of human intention. As Storr (2010) points out, for Hayek «sponta-
neous orders are the unintended consequence of the nonetheless purposeful 
action of multiple individuals». As mentioned by Lavoie, «in economics market 
processes stands for what is really a more fundamental category which applies 
not only to markets, but to all sorts of institutions: spontaneous order. It is the 
principle that the social manifestation of meaningful action is that of an evolv-
ing system which exhibits systematic, but generally unintended, consequenc-
es» (Lavoie 1994: 56). The critics claim that in the Schutzian scheme there is 
no reflection around this notion and, in this sense, the Schutzian categories 
are insufficient. Even Koppl, who has made one of the biggest contributions to 
enlighten on the strengths of Schutz’s theory for the Austrian audience, asserts 
that Schutz does not recognize clearly that human action can produce unin-
tended systemic consequences (Koppl 2002: 54). However, Storr (2010) pro-
poses that this criticism of Schutz is unfair:  «first, the second order constructs 
that social scientists employ are based on first order common-sense constructs 
that individuals use to negotiate the social world which necessarily make ref-
erence to unintended consequences and spontaneous orders. Secondly, Schütz 
himself often engaged in causal spontaneous order analysis» (Storr 2010: 176). 
Storr argues that «social stock of knowledge emerges spontaneously» and that 
as a consequence of the pragmatic motive governing the actors in the social 
world understood as a spontaneous social order that contains multiple and 
emerging «made orders», the actors should resort to their stock of knowledge 
to explain the unintended consequences of their actions and other people’s ac-
tions. He adds that «individuals are necessarily spontaneous order theorists». 
Here, Schutzian theory, as though it had fallen into the bed of Procrustes, is 
forced to fit the size of the Hayekian liberal theory of order as regards the no-
tion of unintended consequences. However, Schutz resorts to categories of his 
own to understand the social order resulting from his particular notion of the 
life-world and the analysis of the unintended consequences in Schutz’s work 
not only implies the reification of the author’s heuristic framework but also 
entails defining him as a theorist of liberal order.
Economic theory and liberal politics
A systematic and explicit reflection on the connection between Schutz’s 
thought on social order and liberal politics can be found in a recent article 
by Koppl and Augier (2011) on the occasion of the publication of an inter-
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view with Schutz dating from 1958 (Greaves 1958). In the introduction to the 
interview, the authors contend that: «it may still be true that many of Alfred 
Schutz’s admirers have a limited appreciation for the importance of the eco-
nomic theory and liberal politics in Schutz’s formative years as a young scholar» 
(Koppl & Augier 2011: 15. Italics in original). Mises was a powerful advocate 
of the political philosophy of classical liberalism and, given the strong connec-
tion between Schutz and the Austrian School of Mises, which was strongly 
liberal in the old-fashioned European sense of peace, free trade, and limited 
government: «liberalism and the Austrian School of Economics were twin 
influences on the young Schutz» (Koppl & Augier 2011: 16). 
The authors also make reference to Schutzian review of Mises’ 1933 book 
Grundprobleme der Nationalökonomie6. They critically analyzes the editor’s pref-
ace to Schutz’s review where Wagner, Psathas, and Kersten speak of an «ad-
herence to an utterly unrestrained principle of free competition» shared by 
Mises and the rest of the «Viennese School of the theory of marginal utility». 
There, the editors contend that «Schutz himself would not seem to have been 
enthusiastic about a theory of unrestrained (better, cut-throat) competition» 
(Wagner, Psathas, & Kersten 1996: 88). It is reproached that the editors «sup-
ply, however, no evidence» for their claim (Koppl & Augier 2011). As stated 
by Koppl and Augier, the evidence points the other way. Their manuscript 
sets out the theoretical elements of Mises’ and Hayek’s liberalism, quotes 
excerpts of their works which highlight the non-conservative nature of their 
claims, and takes for granted the fact that Schutz inherits that liberal thought 
without presenting the theoretical traits of his hermeneutical framework in 
order to support the assertion. There is not even a single quotation of pas-
sages of his work where his liberalism becomes evident. The evidence pro-
vided by the authors refers to the intellectual context of Schutzian reflection: 
«the evidence suggests that Schutz upheld the liberal views championed by 
Mises» (Koppl & Augier 2011: 23). First, Schutz was a member of the Mont 
Pelerin Society, an association of liberal thinkers; second, Schutz’s review of 
the aforementioned article of Mises, an outline which is not critical in nature; 
finally, the last evidence comes from Schutz’s work for the Austrian Bank-
ing Association. What calls special attention is the fact that the introduction 
that precedes the interview does not provide theoretical evidence to support 
Schutzian alleged liberalism. Moreover, the interview only captures the dif-
ferences between Mises and his students: 
6  This work by Mises has been translated as Epistemological Problems of  Economics (Mises 1933 
[2003]). Helmut Wagner’s English translation of  Schutz’s review appears in volume 4 of  
Schutz’s Collected Papers (1996) as chapter 9, «Basic Problems of  Political Economy».
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with respect to the differences between Mises and his students, Mises was the 
only consistent thinker in terms of  liberalism who made no concession. He has 
fought all kinds of  interference by government. He has always been so radical 
that everyone has had as an argument against Mises that his proposals are not 
possible politically in our times. You have to make concessions (…) If  somebody 
didn’t accept liberalism in its purity, Mises suspected that he was a socialist, 
Marxist, etc. (Greaves 1958: 30. Italics in original).
Despite the value of Koppl’s and Augier’s insights, a brief remark with 
regard to methodology cannot be avoided. In order to attain a deeper under-
standing of a particular sociological theory, the researcher needs to analyze 
several dimensions. According to metatheorizing perspective (Ritzer 1991), 
the first dimension entails turning to the sociological theorist him/her-self 
and examining, among other things, networks and backgrounds, such as 
his/her biographical context, his/her life-worldly experience, his/her corres-
pondence with colleagues, his/her institutional affiliations and professional 
involvement. In the case of Schutz’s theory, this is the dimension developed 
by Koppl and Augier. However, this analysis should be supplemented by a 
second dimension: a detailed examination of the sociological theory itself, 
in our case, Schutzian texts. The third dimension concerns turning to other 
academic disciplines for ideas, tools, concepts, theories and the like that can 
be used in the analysis of Schutzian theory, for instance, the influences of the 
economic discussion in the context of the Austrian School of Economics and 
the Mises Circle and the subsequent impact of his work on the intellectual cir-
cles of interpretive economics and economic sociology. Finally, the fourth di-
mension calls for shifting to the more macro level to look at the larger society 
and the nature of its impact on sociological theorizing. For instance, by exam-
ining the sociohistorical context in which Schutz lived and worked and the na-
tional and international settings. In this regard, should also be recovered the 
impact of Schutzian historical context on his production, as well as the social, 
political and economic problems of his time. Taken together these dimensions 
would lead to a detailed understanding of Schutzian sociological theory. And, 
for this reason, we believe that the analysis of the intellectual context is insuf-
ficient to conclude that Schutz upheld liberal views. Due to space constraints, 
in the following lines we would like to introduce some theoretical elements 
that appear in Schutz’s work which serve as a base to complement the first 
dimension analyzed by the authors. The elements presented do not allow us 
to make any conclusive statement about Schutzian alleged liberalism. On the 
contrary, they unveil the internal tensions present in Schutz’s work.
To begin with, we must turn our attention to Austrian liberalism in order 
to analyze to what extent Schutzian reflections on social order, politics, soci-
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ety and government reproduce the liberal views championed by Mises and, 
specially, by Hayek. As Koppl and Augier claim «Mises and his followers had 
set about to defend Austrian liberalism, which they interpreted as an offshoot 
of the British liberal tradition of David Hume and Adam Smith. The Austrian 
liberals of Mises and his circle defended property rights as essential to liberty. 
Far from being a threat, private property is necessary to ensure that power is 
dispersed and the dangers of state power are kept in check» (Koppl & Augier 
2011: 17).  In «The principles of Liberal social order» (1967), Hayek mentions 
this fact. At the beginning of the manuscript he also contends that liberalism 
«derives from the discovery of a self-generating or spontaneous order in social 
affairs (…), an order which made it possible to utilize the knowledge and skill 
of all members of society to a much greater extent than would be possible in 
any order created by central direction» (Hayek 1967: 162). Moreover, a dis-
tinction between spontaneous order and organization or arrangement is presented in 
the text as a differentiation between individual and common purposes: while 
organization or arrangement is based on commands, the spontaneous order 
is based on abstract rules which leave individuals free to use their own knowl-
edge for their own purposes. The spontaneous order of a free society will con-
tain many organizations (including government). However, the two principles 
of order cannot be mixed in any manner. The characteristic of a spontaneous 
order is that by using its ordering forces, i.e., the regularity of the conduct of 
its members, it is possible to achieve an order of a much more complex set of 
facts that it could ever be achieved by deliberate arrangement. Particularly, 
the order of the market rests not on common purposes but on reciprocity, that 
is «on the reconciliation of different purposes for the mutual benefit of the par-
ticipants» (Hayek 1967: 163). It is in this regard that Hayek «criticizes the idea 
that orderly arrangements must be either born of nature or arranged through 
artifice. His alternative, spontaneous order, relies on the unintentional coor-
dination of intentional actions» (Heath 2005: 69). As a consequence, the very 
idea of spontaneous order is linked to a political theory of liberalism (Heath 
2005). As stated by Hayek: «free men who are to be allowed to use their own 
knowledge for their own purposes must therefore not be subject to rules which 
tell them what they must positively do, but only to rules which tell them what 
they must not do (…) the rules of just conduct thus merely delimit the range 
of permissible actions but do not determine the particular actions a man must 
take at a particular moment» (Hayek 1967: 167).
Schutzian review of Santayana’s text on «Dominations and Powers» (Schutz 
1964b) provides a first access to recover his position on social order, politics, 
society and government. In the same manner as the review of Mises’ manu-
script, «the presentation of Santayana’s thought follows as closely as possible 
his own wording» (Brodersen 1964: xiv), i.e., without a clear critical intention. 
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Santayana’s study of society and government is structured in three different 
levels: the generative, the militant and the rational orders. The three orders 
are, as Schutz claims, ideal-typical constructs in the established terminology 
of the social sciences. The first «Powers and Dominations» occurs in the gen-
erative order which is the order of growth, custom, and tradition. But as soon 
as the natural growth of the human family is disturbed or disrupted, and the 
dominance of a different social unit is substituted for it, complications may 
arise within traditional society. The new social order is no longer biological 
but is voluntarily imposed, because potentialities in the psyche now come to 
consciousness before they are habitually realized in action. There is therefore 
a contrast, and often a conflict, between the new prompting at work and the 
traditional convention. This conflict constitutes the militant order of society, 
which includes all voluntary associations that cross the generative order of 
society (not only military bands, but also political parties and religious sects). 
The generative order corresponds as a whole to Power because it gathers the 
emergence of those elements society needs; the militant order corresponds to 
Domination or to the emergence of control and the imposition of some pow-
ers upon others; the third one, corresponds to virtue, because democracy or 
representative government are displayed as the rational way to harmonize 
former elements (Moreno Moreno 2007: 134). As stated, these ideal-typical 
constructs are interwoven in reality. The construction of the three orders is 
only a methodical device adopted in order to study «Powers and Domina-
tions» within each of them, as well as to mark the Domination which each 
order exercises over the rest. According to Schutz, it is in the militant order 
that the interplay of Dominations and Powers appears most clearly (Schutz 
1964b: 210).
Schutz makes clear two attitudes toward Santayana’s ideas. Santayana 
leaves the reader «in a state of bewilderment as well as of admiration» (Schutz 
1964b: 224). Firstly, with bewilderment Schutz confronts Santayana’s mate-
rialistic-naturalistic position, the key concept at the foundation of his concep-
tion of society and government. Schutz criticizes Santayana’s metaphysical 
assumption that the generative order of society is the paramount social real-
ity upon which all the other orders are founded. This is due to the attempt 
to deal with individuals from the point of view of a naturalist and materialist 
«who is not satisfied with an analysis of the world as taken for granted but 
aims at founding life, psyche, and spirit, in brief, human nature, upon the 
physical order of nature» (Schutz 1964b: 224-225). Secondly, admiration is 
due to his truly philosophical craftsmanship in organizing the problems of a 
philosophical anthropology around the existential experience of the human 
situation within the world; admiration is due also to the consistency with 
which social and political life is described in terms of a drama of will, psyche, 
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and spirit oscillating between the vacant, the indifferent, and the vital forms 
of liberty, and the forms of necessary and voluntary servitude (Schutz 1964b: 
224). The realm of vital liberty – the inner liberty of the spirit, understood 
as the «awakened inner attention» – opens a chasm between the demands of 
the natural powers of primal will and the path open to action. This conflict 
is manifested in various forms of servitude. Government has traits of the 
militant order of society in which the drama of will manifests. This drama 
«of primal will, psyche, and spirit in the various realms of vacant, contingent, 
and vital liberty, undergoing the various forms of necessary and voluntary 
servitude, is one of the constituent factors of the genetic order of society» 
(Schutz 1964b: 213).
This is not the first time that Schutz recovers Santayana’s thought. Accord-
ing to Schutz the mainstream of Husserl’s argument in Ideas II, has similarities 
with certain themes presented by «William James, Santayana, Dewey, George 
H. Mead, Cooley, and others» (Schutz 1966: 36). Moreover, Schutz takes up 
the notion of animal faith proposed by Santayana in order to support his defi-
nition of intersubjectivity: 
Intersubjective experience, communication, sharing of  something in common 
presupposes, thus, in the last analysis faith in the Others truthfulness, animal 
faith in the sense of  Santayana; it presupposes that I take for granted the Oth-
er’s possibility of  bestow upon one of  the innumerable sub-universes the ac-
cent of  reality, and on the other hand that he, the Other, takes for granted 
that I, too, have open possibilities for defining what is my dream, my phantasy, 
my real life. This is the last insight into the intersubjective dialectic of  reality 
(Schutz 1964a: 155). 
This theoretical evidence suggests that Schutz has strong connection with 
Santayana’s ideas of animal faith. And animal faith, in turn, has a connec-
tion with Keynesian notion «animal spirit» (Padua 2014: 37). However, we 
cannot be conclusive on this point and these guidelines need to be further 
developed. What is important to mention here is that an argument focused on 
the intellectual context of Schutzian thought should be further enriched with 
an analysis of the conceptual and philosophical work of the author. Taking 
this dimension into account, it should be nuanced, as Wagner does, the state-
ment that the mere membership of Schutz to Mises Circle constitutes evidence 
that Schutz was a liberal thinker. According to Wagner, what kept Schutz 
within the Mises Circle were «its underlying interpretive assumptions» in terms 
of which economic processes were explained. It is with this backdrop in mind, 
that we can support Wagner’s idea that: «Schutz accepted marginal utility 
theory in principle. However, in contrast to von Hayek and in agreement 
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with many other students of von Mises, he did not subscribe to the extreme 
economic liberalism of his teacher» (Wagner 1983: 12). 
As seen previously, Schutz appreciates Santayana’s reflections on conflict 
and drama of will that the author highlights as characteristic of social and po-
litical life and which is described in terms of a drama of will, psyche, and spirit 
that oscillates between the vital forms of liberty and the forms of necessary 
and voluntary servitude. As I have shown elsewhere (López 2014a), another 
kind of tension or conflict appears in Schutz’s early work as one of the prelimi-
nary conditions of social order. And this tension has certain similarities with 
the one proposed by Santayana. In Schutz’s words, the multiplicity of social 
persons that «revolve» around the nucleus of the self range from the intimate 
person to the full development of the process of anonymization in the social 
world. The incorporation of the external world means that the person finds: 
givennesses and structures that do not stem from me, myself, but instead are 
pregiven from without forcing on me an attitude along with an attention à la 
vie coming from the things themselves but not from the sources of  my durée, 
from my intimate person, and that are, so to speak, imposed upon me (Schutz 
2013a: 235-236).
At all levels, we find «a continuous transition from the absolute intimate 
person to the highest anonymous behavior» and «the tension continues» to the 
highest anonymous contemporary world. There is a development of the pro-
cess of anonymization in the social world. Supplementary typifications appear 
because it is not I alone who carry out my own self-chosen plans, but I work 
together «with others and against others, also caring and setting goals not just 
for my self but also for others» (Schutz 2013a: 237). This issue «concerns the 
problem of intrinsic relevance (…) in contradistinction to the type of relevance 
imposed» (Barber 2013: footnote 139). The process of anonymization in the 
social world involves imposed relevances which prescribe our personal choice: 
custom and culture, customary and self-imposed duties and rights, inclination 
and upbringing, prescribe certain of  our attitudes toward our fellow human 
beings, our personal choice and the external need assign us our place in the so-
cial cosmos with which we are satisfied or which we may strive to change (Schutz 
2013a: 243-244).
As a citizen of my community, for instance, «as someone who belongs to 
my political party, as a member of my church, over against these contempo-
rary, more or less anonymous institutions, I take up attitudes that have their origins 
in quite distinctly anchored levels of my self» (Schutz 2013b: 247. Emphasis added). 
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Occasionally, it would seem that all of the sides of my self are independent 
persons with their own wishes and wills. However, «it is consistent with the 
unity and unification of self-consciousness that always other sides of ourselves; 
other moments of our personality, are put into play in our daily social life 
while other and perhaps more essential sides, where not entirely excluded, are 
thus still in such measure crowded in the background» (Schutz 2013b: 249-
250). There is the diversity of standardized or normative attitudes demanded 
of me at every step by living in the cultural world of daily life (for instance, If 
I am to travel by train, then I must conduct myself according to the prescrip-
tions required when traveling by train). In everyday life, specific attitudes in 
their standardization and normativeness are imposed on us. They touch upon 
a peripheral sphere of ourselves, we incorporate them on the basis of our edu-
cation, inclinations, our settling of goals, without thinking too much about 
them. The ultimate goals of our bearing on the great systems of the state, of 
the law and of the economy are of an entirely similar nature. 
In short, a tension or interplay between intrinsic and imposed relevan-
ces constitutes one of the preliminary conditions of social order in Schutzian 
scheme. The freedom of the individual to choose what he/she is interested 
in, is confronted with the fact that we work «with others and against others», 
and this incorporation of the external social world involves that imposed rel-
evances prescribe our personal choice. Among the diversity of standarized 
or normative attitudes which are imposed upon us, the state, the law and the 
economy establish the ultimate goals of our bearing. However, the tension is 
reflected in the fact that we could be satisfied or we could strive to change the 
imposed duties and rights. It is important to mention that this tension, which 
may vary in different social, cultural and historical contexts, should be em-
pirically explored.
The connection between Schutzian theory of relevances and Hayekian 
theory of spontaneous order has also been explored by Mori (2009). The au-
thor suggests that «Schutz should have already understood Hayek’s view on 
so-called given data as the problem of relevance» (Mori 2009: 529). Addition-
ally, he points out that the relevance theory itself «leads to a spontaneous order». 
In our view, there is not in Hayek’s theory such a tension between intrinsic 
and imposed relevances. Free men who are to be allowed to use their own 
knowledge for their own purposes must not be subject to duties, that is, to 
rules which tell them what they must positively do. In this respect, the main 
dangers of state power are pointed out. On the contrary, Schutzian theory of 
relevances points out to the very existence of a conflict and a tension within 
social order between intrinsic relevances, which are related to the freedom of 
the individual to choose what he/she is interested in, and imposed relevances, 
which have to do with the fact that situations are also imposed on us as signifi-
SOCIETÀMUTAMENTOPOLITICA224
cant although they are not related to our own interests. For these reasons, we 
argue that it is no possible to explain the theory of the intrinsic and imposed 
relevances as an extension of Hayekian theory of unintended consequences. 
There is not a self-regulation or reconciliation of the different interests and 
purposes nor an unintentional coordination of intentional actions within so-
cial order but interplay of intrinsic and imposed relevances. Pointing out this 
deficiency in the economic theory of the self-regulated or spontaneous mar-
kets from Schutzian sociology not only allows placing Schutz on the same crit-
ical line as the new economic sociology regarding the marginalist economic 
school, as it supposes the existence of self-regulated markets and of a homo 
economicus who organizes his/her actions according to perfect rational criteria, 
but mainly, it may be asserted that, in contrast with Hayek and Mises, Schutz 
did not subscribe to extreme liberalism in his intellectual context.
Final comments
In this work, we aimed to synthesize a phenomenological program for socio-
logical analysis of economic action and of the order of the market processes 
which serves as a foundation for the development of a phenomenologically 
oriented economic sociology. In this regard, we showed that there is in Schut-
zian phenomenologically oriented sociology an economic sociology in embry-
onic form which has not been deeply explored and which can build bridges 
between sociology and economics. 
Firstly, we showed, against the background of the Mises Circle, that Schutz’s 
epistemological concern was directed not only at social sciences in general but 
also at economics in particular. Social scientist both economist and sociologist 
need to explain the economic phenomena using the postulate of subjective 
interpretation and the postulate of adequacy. Both should refer to the actor 
within the social world. The notion of life-world becomes the touchstone of 
Schutzian theory of social sciencies, of sociology and of economics. Secondly, 
Schutz’s contribution to reflections on economic sociology is also based on the 
subsequent reappropriation of his work. The subsequent recovery of Schutz’s 
work shows its relevance both for theoretical and empirical research in eco-
nomic sociology. For this reason, a phenomenological program for theoretical 
and empirical research of the market phenomena from Schutzian sociology 
must incorporate his reflections on intersubjectivity and notions such as com-
mon-sense of knowledge, the theory of the ideal types, the theory of expecta-
tions, the theory of relevances and the theory of symbols. Finally, as regards 
the problem of coordination as a way to approach the order of the market pro-
cesses, we demonstrated that Schutzian sociology makes it possible to point 
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out the limitations of the economic theory of the spontaneous or self-regulated 
market orders to such an extent that it can be asserted that Schutz did not 
subscribe to extreme economic liberalism in his intellectual context. This re-
covery and systematization of Schutzian vocabulary -in the interface between 
sociology and economics- many times ignored in sociological reflections on 
economics, can contribute with new elements not only to think from a the- 
oretical point of view but also to address the economic phenomena empirically.
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